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Abstract 
This chapter represents an effort to identify the components of international space law that apply to 
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It argues that, while other national and international 
regimes of law apply to UAV activities, international space law is implicated only to the extent that 
UAV technology relies on satellite services for control and guidance purposes. 
 
I. Introduction: UAVs and space law? 
 
Drones, or, more officially, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),1 are among the most im-
portant, challenging, but also controversial topics of today in international law. Machines 
defined or loosely labeled as UAVs are increasingly used for making fascinating but also 
intrusive pictures from above, which raises issues of privacy and trespassing, and other 
such machines are used for taking out terrorists or other military opponents—and some-
times killing innocent bystanders in the process. 
For simplicity’s sake we might picture these two generic uses to represent the two ends 
of a scale of a broad array of technologies used for a broad array of activities all qualifying 
as UAVs: on the one end of the scale, small, almost toylike instruments flying sometimes 
as low as only a handful of meters and used for, by and large, peaceful, sometimes even 
merely entertainment purposes, and on the other end small-helicopter-sized vehicles ca-
pable of operating at altitudes of tens of kilometers and launching missiles precisely to 
targets back on earth. 
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One way or another, these new developments and the varying interests in monitoring 
and controlling, alternatively stimulating, and further extending them, time and again also 
gave rise to questions regarding what “space law” had to say about them. Were such ac-
tivities forbidden, conditioned, controlled, or otherwise legally conditioned by space law? 
This chapter represents an effort to try to answer that question, so far at a rather highly 
abstract level. It will largely focus on international space law, noting all the while that other 
regimes of law, national or to some extent even international, might or would also have 
regulated DAV-activities. This in turn means that this analysis is not complete by far, at 
least from the perspective of analyzing the legal aspects and parameters of UAV operations 
and activities. 
In order to address the question regarding the extent to which UAVs are subject to space 
law and what boundaries space law would provide for their operations, it is first important 
to determine what “space law” is. “Space law” then, as for the international part thereof 
constituting a branch of general public international law,2 can be defined somewhat more 
precisely as “every legal or regulatory regime having a significant impact, even if implicitly 
or indirectly, on at least one type of space activity or major space application.”3 
Following a long-standing, largely theoretical debate on the respective spheres of appli-
cation of space law and air law, as the other main body of (international but also national) 
law dealing with activities above the Earth’s surface, two main doctrinal approaches have 
emerged which address in greater detail the scope of space law, actual as well as concep-
tual. 
 
II. Space law or air law—The “functionalist” approach 
 
Under the so-called “functionalist” approach, determining which of the two legal regimes 
applies to a certain activity, event, or situation above the earth’s surface should follow a 
determination of the fundamental character of the activity, event, or situation at issue. Is it 
essentially a “space” activity, in terms of type of operations (such as launching a satellite 
or astronauts) and/or technology (such as rockets being launched vertically using rocket 
propulsion and satellites in orbit using radio frequencies)? Or is it essentially an “aviation” 
activity, again in terms of type of operations (such as flying humans or cargo from one 
place on earth to another) and/or technology (such as aircraft taking off and landing in 
almost horizontal modes using wings to benefit from the upward lift of the air)? 
In other words: following this approach, if a UAV would be a “space object,” it would 
be subject to space law4; if it would be an “aircraft,” it would be subject to air law.5 
“Aircraft” is defined quite precisely at the international level, as “any machine that can 
derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of 
the air against the earth’s surface.”6 As a UAV is usually being defined as an “aircraft with-
out a human pilot on board,”7 it will be obvious that indeed they would seem to fall 
squarely within the definition of “aircraft” and hence to that extent be subject to air law. 
Any UAVs with wings or rotors as well as any balloons labeled UAVs would thus qualify 
as aircraft and be subject to those parts of air law of which application is triggered by a 
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device involved being an aircraft. This does not however in itself negate the possible ap-
plication of space law to operations with such UAVs, as in principle two (or even more) 
legal regimes could come to be applied to one and the same activity, event, or situation. 
Additionally, another issue arises here. In reality, the legal regimes applicable to aircraft 
as developed over the last century or so were largely based on an (usually unspoken) as-
sumption, namely that aircraft are flown by human pilots on board. These manned aspects 
of aviation operations are key to arrangements on safety such as crew certification,8 traffic 
management as it depends upon instant decision-making and maneuverability by (a) pi-
lot(s) on board,9 and liability arrangements which prominently include issues of damage 
to passengers and cargo.10 
UAVs, in contrast, are by definition unmanned, which is probably why the comparison 
with space objects—so far being overwhelmingly unmanned as well—is so often made. 
Because so much of space law addresses space objects as essentially remotely guided and 
unmanned objects just like UAVs, future legislators and regulators on UAVs may still oc-
casionally look to existing space law for guidance in their development of such future leg-
islation and regulation. This does not, of course, in and of itself mean that UAVs are, as 
such, potentially or likely qualifying as space objects, such as to trigger the applicability of 
space law in addition to air law. 
A further problem here is that a space object as far as international treaty law is con-
cerned is only partly “defined,” as “includ[ing] component parts of a space object as well 
as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”11 However, doctrine has meanwhile been able to 
come up with a slightly more comprehensive and helpful definition, which could be sum-
marized as “any man-made object which is at least attempted to be physically brought into 
outer space.”12 
The definition of a space object thus finally raises another issue at this point relative to 
UAVs. If a space object indeed is defined with reference to the aim to bring it into “outer 
space,” this begs the question as to what “outer space” refers to—which in tum brings 
analysis to the other approach to applying air law respectively space law. This still is not 
likely to include UAVs, as most or indeed all of them will constitute neither an object in-
tended for outer space itself, nor a launch vehicle or a component part of something else 
to be brought into outer space, but ultimately that of course depends on where outer space 
is supposed to begin. 
 
III. Space law or air law—The “spatialist” approach 
 
Under the so-called “spatialist” approach then, determining which of the two legal regimes 
applies to a certain activity, event, or situation above the earth’s surface should follow a 
determination of where such activity, event, or situation takes place: in airspace or in outer 
space. Following this approach, for the current discussion that means that if (respective to 
the extent that) a DAV-operation takes place in outer space it would be subject to space 
law13; whereas if (respective to the extent that) it takes place in airspace, it would be subject 
to air law.14 
This approach is corroborated by the very fundamental legal difference between the 
two realms. While outer space is not subject to appropriation by any state and hence is best 
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qualified as an “international realm” or a “global commons”15; airspace is subject to the 
full sovereignty of the underlying state,16 which only leaves the airspaces above the high 
seas to be qualified as an “international realm.”17 
That obviously then raises the issue of definition of “airspace” respective to “outer space.” 
In this respect, however, neither the Chicago Convention nor the Outer Space Treaty pro-
vide any clear-cut definitions. As for the Chicago Convention, that made sense historically 
speaking, since at the time no one—except for a few theoretical treatises—legally addressed 
any higher realm which might possibly not be considered airspace. As for the aviation op-
erations it addressed, regardless of what exact altitude they might have reached, these were 
never contested as to their taking place in airspace and hence if above some state’s territory 
or territorial waters, plainly considered to fall within such a state’s territorial sovereignty. 
That obviously changed with Sputnik in 1957—yet in spite of the many discussions ever 
since addressing the issue, no consensus so far has arisen as to the altitude at which airspace 
exactly was supposed to give way to outer space.18 Some states, including most notably the 
United States, even refused to agree on the need to establish a boundary, for reasons hark-
ing back—as far as the legal ones were concerned—to the “functionalist” approach and the 
absence of a need to provide for such a boundary. Even among the states and experts 
agreeing in principle on the need for a boundary, a number of theories (such as that of 
lowest perigee or highest aerodynamic lift) were applied to arrive at—certainly early on—
wildly differing numbers. 
The most that can be said as of today is that, with the caveats made above, a gradual 
convergence could be seen on an altitude of 100 km above sea level as the (at least politi-
cally speaking) most reasonable lower boundary of outer space. As of now, this precise 
number has been referenced in this precise context in the national space legislation of four 
countries: Australia,19 Kazakhstan,20 Denmark,21 and Nigeria.22 In addition, more indirect 
references can been found in other state-originating documents as well as some non-state 
documents.23 
Such a boundary-line from a practical perspective does seem to be a workable provi-
sional solution. So far, only a few very special satellites or other space objects are known 
to have been able to complete an orbit around the earth at altitudes below a 100 km, whereas 
no vehicle making use of the upward lift of the air has been able to fly close to such alti-
tudes (unless using non-aircraft technologies). 
As it turns out also such a spatialist approach would rule out the applicability of space 
law to UAVs as such. The record altitudes so far registered for UAVs refer to 12.5 km for 
devices with rotors, 29.5 km for devices with wings, and 53 km for balloons24—all clearly 
far below any altitude that could sensibly be argued to constitute “outer space.” Conse-
quently, also under a spatialist approach UAV operations are essentially subject to air law, 
as premised on the sovereignty of the underlying state over its airspace—as well as any 
other national law and regulation that such underlying state may wish to extend to its 
airspace, such as criminal law.25 
Following this, for instance the entry into a state’s airspace without that state’s consent 
is illegal, unless justified as an exception under international law in terms of either distress 
or (particularly relevant in the case of drones used for antiterrorist actions in other coun-
tries) self-defense or other legitimate uses of force in the international arena. Likewise—
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particularly relevant for the other end of the scale, the small UAVs used for civil, commer-
cial, or hobby purposes—national laws on privacy, trespassing, and interference with 
property rights, liability for damage, and intellectual property rights apply in the respec-
tive airspaces of the countries where such UAVs operate. Also issues of air navigation and 
traffic management, in order to make sure DAV-operations would never endanger com-
mercial or civil aviation, are subject to national legal regimes (and some international har-
monization or coordination as per the Chicago Convention26). 
Freedom of flight, from such a perspective, may exist only over the high seas, although 
on the one hand relevant internationally agreed rules of the law of the sea might limit such 
freedoms, and on the other hand the requirement for states to register such vehicles and 
thereby exercise jurisdiction over them, may still “import” national legal limitations on such 
operations over the high seas. 
 
IV. Space law and UAVs—The involvement of satellites 
 
Following the extensive analysis just given, the only area where space law will be funda-
mentally engaged in regulating the activities of UAVs as of now is where they are con-
trolled and guided by satellites—which in turn undoubtedly are space objects falling 
within the scope of space law under the functionalist approach and do by and large operate 
in outer space, thus also falling within the scope of space law under the spatialist approach. 
On the one hand, this means that such satellite control and guidance has to take place 
within the general parameters of international space law, such as most notably of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention. It should, for ex-
ample, constitute a “use of outer space . . . for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries,”27 which of course severely limits the legitimate possibilities of using satellites for the 
guidance of armed drones. It should not—at least, not without further consultation with 
states potentially affected—interfere in a harmful manner with other legitimate activities 
in outer space and, by proxy, by and large on Earth or in airspace as well.28 Private opera-
tors providing such satellite control and guidance services should be appropriately author-
ized and continuously supervised by the relevant national authorities.29 The satellites in-
volved should also be appropriately registered both nationally and internationally.30 
Also, any such satellite causing damage could be subject to the provisions of Article VII 
of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. It should be noted here, however, 
that the definition of damage under the latter, as “loss of life, personal injury or other im-
pairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or 
juridical or property of international intergovernmental organizations” “caused by [a] 
space object,”31 is generally understood to refer to direct damage caused by kinetic impact, 
so as to rule out any indirect damage caused by a UAV controlled and/or guided by such a 
satellite.32 That is to say that, at least, the Liability Convention could not serve as a legal 
basis for claims regarding such damage. 
Beyond those fairly general parameters, the Outer Space Treaty provides for the free-
dom of activities in outer space as a baseline,33 where further limits are only imposed by 
general international law, in this case notably as per the UN Charter.34 Thus, the use of 
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such satellites should comply with the requirements of maintenance of international peace 
and security, and the promotion of international cooperation and understanding.35 
Furthermore, UAVs in military service also if controlled and guided by satellites should 
comply with the legal limits to the threat or use of force, which under general international 
law is in principle prohibited against other states36 with, arguably, four main exceptions. 
First, the UN Charter recognizes the right of self-defense against an armed attack, as long 
as the UN Security Council has not taken appropriate action.37 Second, the UN Charter 
under circumstances actually calls upon its member states to use force, within a specific 
UN mandate, against states or other actors violating the international legal order at a very 
high level of severity.38 Third, outside of the UN Charter often a(n older and broader) cus-
tomary right of self-defense has been recognized, although subject to considerable debate 
in view of the potential abuse of such a right.39 Four, there might be forms of use of force 
not meeting the threshold contemplated by the prohibition on the use or threat of force 
contemplated by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, for instance as directed against nonstate 
actors.40 
On the other hand, the specific use of satellite orbits/orbital slots and satellite frequen-
cies also for control and guidance of UAVs has to fall within the parameters of international 
satellite communication law as principally framed by the ITU Constitution,41 ITU Conven-
tion,42 and Radio Regulations.43 
The first point of note here, in particular as for drones used for military operations, con-
cerns the fact that military satellites are, as such, excluded from the scope of the regime 
developed under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) pursu-
ant to the ITU Constitution, the ITU Convention, and the Radio Regulations.44 Obviously, 
however, the laws of physics will and actually do cause military satellite operators to take 
civil satellite usage per the ITU-regime into consideration, as any frequency used by two 
operators at the same time and place in principle results in white noise for both. 
Furthermore, the ITU regime applies only to frequency usage with international ramifi-
cations, which includes satellites and orbit(al slot)s, but all other aspects of satellite opera-
tions—including for instance licensing—are a matter of national law. Thus, the use of a 
satellite for UAV control and guidance exclusively within national airspace and without 
the potential of interference with international frequencies would again be subject to the 
relevant state’s domestic sovereignty. With those caveats, the frequencies and the attendant 
orbital slots or orbits to be used by satellites for controlling and guidance of UAVs have to 
fit within the extended process of allocation of frequency-bands to types of services, allot-
ments of frequencies to certain services, and assignment to the relevant operators thereof.45 
In view of the relative novelty of UAVs and their operations, until recently no specific 
frequency-bands were allocated to this kind of service, which left it unclear whether spe-
cific services and their operators could be allotted/assigned frequencies under different 
headings within Article 1 of the Radio Regulations. One could have considered UAV con-
trol and guidance, for example, to be comprised within the “mobile-satellite service,”46 the 
“aeronautical mobile-satellite service,”47 the “aeronautical mobile-satellite (OR)** service,”48 
the “radiodetermination-satellite service,”49 the “radionavigation-satellite service,”50 the 
“safety service,”51 and/or the “special service.”52 
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Then, however, at the 2015 World Radio Conference (WRC), the ITU conference held 
usually every three or four years to revise as necessary the Radio Regulations,53 ITU-R Res-
olution 155 was adopted.54 This Resolution allows for assignments of frequencies within a 
set of frequency bands to be granted to UAV operators using Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) 
networks under certain conditions, which include development by ICAO of appropriate 
standards and recommended practices for safe operations.55 In other words, ITU has now 
provided a first level of clarity and clearance regarding the inclusion of satellite controlled 
and guided UAV operations in the regime of legitimate use of space frequencies, but many 
details still need to be sorted out and negotiated in this respect. 
 
V. Space law as a model for UAV legislation and regulation 
 
The other potential area of DAV-operations where space law might be or become relevant, 
as mentioned before, concerns the use of the latter as a model for legislation and regulation 
of the former. 
Here, it first has to be noted that, though they are indeed without pilots on board, UAVs 
are still very much maneuverable and hence could better be equated from that perspective 
with manned spacecraft. In other words, UAV operations—military ones left aside, as they 
assume lack of consent by the state concerned in the first place and hence would be subject 
to international law on the use of force—need (to be part of) a traffic management system 
providing for optimum integration of any vehicles in the same physical space, whether 
UAVs, other aircraft, or spacecraft. 
As of yet, however, there is no traffic management system for manned spacecraft, cer-
tainly not at the international level,56 or, for that matter, for space objects as such beyond 
the rudimentary ITU-regime for relatively difficult-to-maneuver satellites and the even 
more rudimentary registration as per the Registration Convention. This means effectively 
that even in international airspaces, UAVs would much more sensibly be subjected to air 
traffic management—not only are UAVs aircraft but air traffic management both nation-
ally and internationally is a well-weathered and legally framed environment, which so far 
even has been able to take care of the occasional launches of space objects inevitably pass-
ing through certain portions of airspace. 
To the extent there is, as yet, one national legal regime providing for some sort of traffic 
management of manned space objects, it concerns the US Commercial Space Launch 
Act57—which however does not use the term “space object,” instead opting for “launch 
vehicle,” which is defined as “(A) a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload or human 
beings in, outer space; and (B) a suborbital rocket.”58 The Act provides for the authority of 
the US Federal Aviation Administration’s Office for Commercial Space Transportation to 
license all activities of those vehicles, also if manned.59 This authority includes the possi-
bility to grant “experimental permits” for activities not even necessarily themselves aiming 
for outer space—as long as, however, the ultimate goal is still to test technologies to be 
used in outer space.60 Thus, it would indeed be questionable whether such an approach 
would ever be applied to UAVs even in the domestic US context without further ado. 
  




Most importantly, the above analysis basically debunks the often-held understanding that 
space law would be a major factor in determining, either as of now or in the future, the 
legal ramifications of and parameters for the use of UAVs. Only to the extent that satellites 
provide control and guidance of UAVs would current space law become involved, which 
as far as military and antiterrorist DAV-operations are concerned would notably include 
general public international law in the area of the use of force. And only to the extent of 
the need to develop a proper traffic management system integrating the operations of 
UAVs, other aircraft and spacecraft alike, certainly as long as operating in the more traffic-
dense areas around the globe (read major parts of the airspaces around the world) could 
space law in theory be of interest—but in practice, thus far, is of little help in the absence 
of anything coming close to a space traffic management system in the first place, with the 
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